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1. Introduction
In Cesar Chavez and the Common Sense of Nonviolence,
José-Antonio Orosco seeks to incorporate Cesar Chavez into
mainstream social and political thought. Given Chavez’s life and
work, this goal necessitates a subsequent blurring of the line
between political theory and activity, an act which seats Chavez
alongside of many Latin American thinkers in the wake of
Comtean positivism. Placing the Mexican-American farmworker
into the tradition of nonviolent political protest, Orosco presents
Chavez as an iconoclastic thinker, i.e., an individual who works
and lives according to ideals that try to change society for the
better. In this sense, Chavez is a community intellectual who
articulated, refined, and embodied these ideals in the first
place (5-6).
This review will first sketch the terrain of Orosco’s account
of the major moments in Chavez’s life and thought. Doing more
than providing an overview of the union leader’s speeches and
letters, Orosco challenges the reader to rethink the complexities
behind Chavez’s actions by presenting his criticism of a variety
of intellectuals and social ideas: e.g., Churchill’s criticism of
nonviolent protest; Fanon and Guevara’s calls for revolutionary
struggle and practice; the idea of property damage as civil unrest
or disobedience; as well as the institutional and social patterns
endorsing a culture of exclusion, oppression, and violence.
According to Orosco, Chavez’s great politico-philosophical
contribution (and also the motivating force behind his social
action) was a profound and nuanced understanding of
nonviolence, “the common sense of nonviolence” (3).
Second, this review will question the recurrent theme
of sacrifice, penitence, and self-knowledge apparent in
Chavez’s theory of nonviolence. My aim here is to question the
performative and sometimes gruesome aspects of Chavez’s
actions, in addition to rethinking the consequences and moral
implications of his type of nonviolent protest. With the explicit
goal of making visible pain and suffering, does the kind of
sacrifice associated with something like fasting constitute or
depend upon a type of violence, albeit a violence to the self?
Chavez’s reason for hunger strikes and long marches was the
desire to engender a level of discomfort allowing for further
understanding of the pain and suffering felt by the victims
of exploitation.1 Does this not maintain that suffering is a
necessary condition for human consciousness (on a critical
reflective level)? On this point Chavez’s stance is similar to
that of G.W.F. Hegel and Sigmund Freud. However, as Orosco
points out, Chavez’s understanding of suffering is connected to
Mexican understandings of penitence, hence “the masochism
of Mexicanidad.” And though the questions I have can be
directed towards nonviolent theory in general, they force one
to consider Chavez as more than just a political activist or union
organizer. They present the reader with Cesar Chavez, Latino
philosopher.

2. A Cultural “Revolution”
The political philosophy of such figures as Thomas Hobbes
assumes a philosophical anthropology founded on axioms
undergirding much Western political thought: humans as

violent, competitive, self-interested beings subject to a scarcity
of goods and in need of governance.2 Although a philosophy
of non-violence and any political action based on this theory
challenges this view, the difficulties that arise from the attempt
to make peaceful social organization the basis for human
life seemingly prove the Hobbesian humanism. Cautiously
avoiding the traps of identity politics and banking on the
“commonsensical” aspects of Chavez’s thought, Orosco argues
that the nonviolent life requires an understanding of human
social organization that does not rest upon political power as the
exercise of domination, but a commitment to justice understood
as the alleviation of oppression through self-sacrifice.
From the onset of his book Orosco is keen to point out that
there is an unprecedented concern (or even fear) of the growing
Latino/a population in the United States. He stresses that many
advertisers, politicians, and cultural critics are beginning to
focus attention on this emerging population (1). And though
such a large group of people is no more united than the rest
of the country, some hold that there is reason to believe that
a growing fractious collective is on the rise.3 These suspicions
are part of a cultural attitude that requires negativity, exclusion,
and polarization. The thought can be expressed through the
following sentiment: “We are Americans, our values represent
the core American way of life…they are not of our way of life
therefore they are not American.” For Chavez, this attitude was
apparent in treatment of Mexican farmworkers as a transitory
labor force undeserving of respect. Moreover, the subsequent
dehumanization of these people allowed for the establishment
of a sub-working-class who can be dealt with in any manner
necessary—personal and institutionalized forms of violence
(e.g., institutional racism) often being the most apt.4
Chavez’s encounters with nativist social prejudice and
the endemic racism of the mid-twentieth century inspired his
awareness of the need for social justice (19). Anticipating the
political power that an emerging Hispanic population would
hold, Chavez saw oppressive social structures and racist
practices as an attempt to delay this power. Fittingly, one of
the main goals of Orosco’s text is to show how Chavez and La
Causa represent a collective effort to unify farmworkers through
a sense of historical agency. This is social organization through
a self-determination that looks past the immediate goals or
setbacks of a movement while considering future injustices
(6). This unification ensures the type of empowerment that
combats the oppressive conditions under which many workers
lived, in addition to providing a network that would challenge
the racist attitudes of white America.
Although figures like Huntington, Hanson, and even Chavez
himself see this self-determination as the awakening of a
sleeping Hispanic power-block, Orosco argues that Latino/as
do not represent a unanimous, ominous collective but a
heterogeneous group seeking inclusion into the American
dream (21-22). However, if Chavez is banking on the idea that
people in similar positions of oppression share analogous
demands for justice, then there is room for argument with
Orosco about the last point. Nonetheless, there is no doubt
that Chavez attempted to provide Latino/as with a sense of
civic responsibility and democratic participation while striving
to engender a culture of peace inside of the United States.
His direct goal was not to change the policies of U.S. society,
although changes were required insofar as the system itself
is prejudicial. More important was the transformation of the
culture that supports and provides the values of this country,
since Chavez is of the opinion that these values are misplaced
or wrong (this being the subversive or revolutionary aspect of La
Causa) (44). Following this line of thought, it is safe to argue that
Chavez understood the formal policies of a nation as responding
to the culture that supports or warrants its necessity.
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Given that his goal was to change the culture of U.S. society,
which in consequence would reformulate the nation, his
objective could be called “trans-national.”5 This trans-national
approach is the basis for Orosco’s criticism of Churchill’s
critique of nonviolent political protest and the narrow traps of
identity politics found in some Chicano politics. For example,
Orosco shows how Churchill thinks nonviolent political theory
mistakenly assumes the moral high ground when choosing
not to engage in revolutionary military combat, as if moral
superiority is enough to persuade a state to stop its oppressive
tactics (35). Presenting what amounts to Chavez’s critique
of this line of reasoning, Orosco writes that there are three
conceptual mistakes which support the pro-violence view:
(1) the understanding of political authority as ultimately the
exercise of violence (the myth of violence), (2) the lack of vision
into the real potency of moral criticism, and (3) the inability
to recognize that the immediate goal of nonviolent theory
is not the overturning the state (37-44). Focusing on the last,
Orosco writes, “Chavez speaks of developing power not for the
immediate purpose of overthrowing the state but for creating
alternatives to mainstream political and economic institutions
that will be the focal points for engaging people in activities
to learn democratic skills and abilities for self-determination”
(44).
Along the same lines, Chavez’s criticism of the type of
identity politics found in narrow Chicano nationalism pushes
a “trans-national” agenda. Stopping racist behavior and
formulating an authentic sense of self is crucial for Hispanic,
Latino/as, Chicano/as, etc. However, the positing of an identity
construed in strict oppositional terms—situations where, as
Orosco writes, “Chicano/a identity derives its content primarily
by defining itself against, or by rejecting, white mainstream
culture” (81)—does nothing to combat the underlying structures
and causes of oppression. Moreover, as I tried to convey above,
it revels in the same pattern of thought that motivates nativist
ideology. This is not to say that all Chicano nationalism lacks
a structural component nor is this a homogenous movement.
But, as the author writes, “[m]erely challenging mainstream
America’s racism, as narrow ethnic nationalism did, might
diminish the resources of cultural violence that lend support
to structural violence; but that strategy would not, by itself,
dismantle the institutions of power that marginalize and
discriminate against people of color” (85).
Likewise, as the chapter on “structural violence” or
institutional prejudice shows, focusing solely on policy changes
or specific public practices does not venture far enough
to dispel the cultural prejudices that spark racist (and thus
violent) institutions and ways of life (72). Building on the work
of Johan Galtung and Jürgen Habermas, Orosco argues that
“cultural violence,” oppressive behavior that results in what
can be called structural or institutional violent acts (i.e., the
necessary assimilation of one group into another for reasons
based upon the fear of becoming a bilingual or multicultural
society), can still occur in settings where little or no personal
violence is taking place.
In this manner the progressive element of La Causa
becomes obvious, especially when Orosco uses Chavez’s
words to convey the idea that the movement “doesn’t have to
be experienced twice” (22). Put differently, the farmworkers’
struggle, which in this sense is more than just a movement for
farmworkers, does not begin from scratch with every generation.
Building upon past achievements, a culture of peace requires
a rethinking of “time” (a point which I will return to later) and
continual dialogue towards a more just society (23). Placing
Latino/as and migrant workers of a variety of backgrounds
into the American imaginary as affective contributors to this

conversation, this progressive minded dialogue synthesizes the
oppositional points of view that sometimes appear intransigently
locked in the bitter confines of identity politics, another point
that supports Chavez’s reasoning for the de-centering of race
as the basis for La Causa (85).
Though there remains some tension in Orosco’s portrayal
of Chavez as a reformist who sought to create social change
by changing the values that are said to historically define the
“American” mentality (i.e., assimilative, pro Anglo-Protestant
hegemonic beliefs), a culture of peace does not come as a result
of cultural imposition or aggressive take over. The supporters
of La Causa are not attempting to override American culture
by overt aggressive tactics or overwhelming numbers. On
the contrary, Chavez’s culture of peace begins in the relaying
of social injustices, an act that requires not only affective
communication but also personal encounters with suffering.
Undergirded by a humanism differing from that espoused in
traditional pre-political violent social relations, the encounter
with suffering is not self-alienating or exclusive, but receptive
towards foreigners and the difference they bring.

3. The Masochism of Mexicanidad
For Chavez, the liberation of the oppressed members of a society
should serve as the impetus of self-realization. The most famous
line that expresses this idea is often quoted,
When we are really honest with ourselves we must
admit that our lives are all that really belong to us. So
it is how we use our lives that determines what kind
of men we are. It is my deepest belief that only by
giving our lives do we find life. I am convinced that the
truest act of courage, the strongest act of manliness is
to sacrifice ourselves for others in a totally nonviolent
struggle for justice. To be a man is to suffer for others.
God help us to be men.” (91)
Also the basis for a new masculinity, since Chavez thinks
that too many young men are influenced by a commercially
driven culture that promotes the exercise of power as an act of
domination,6 the idea of self-sacrifice is a form of self-realization
grounded in the liberation of the other. This humanism requires
a willingness to combat social injustice and share in the
suffering of the oppressed members of society. However, to
sacrifice oneself to those in need requires familiarity with what
the other is going through: commiseration.
At the heart of Chavez’s many marches and long fast
was the hope that intentional suffering would inspire a sense
of reflection that allows one to understand unjustified pain.
For Orosco, this type of asceticism is grounded in Mexican
culture and folk-wisdom (24). This being “the Masochism of
Mexicanidad,” a fixation with suffering often seen in Mexican
religious practice and worship, 7 there is a performative
and ritualistic aspect to these public expressions of sorrow.
Reverence for Christ and the Passion are also present in
penitential suffering.
For those exploited like the farmworkers, those who
labor but only receive inadequate monetary compensation,
their marches and days without food are meant to provide
a cleansing that allows for insights into one’s condition: selfknowledge (25-29). In this setting a culture of peace provides
the type of reflection that not only generates a profound
demand for justice but also challenges the idea that through
war self-reflection becomes possible. As Orosco points out,
the self-awareness often credited to moments of war are not
as helpful in the realization of self-consciousness as one might
think. This is the basis for the criticism of Fanon and Guevara
available in the text, considering that these revolutionaries
prescribe to an idea that self-determination includes the violent
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overthrow of unjust political situations; the self-numbing that
allows for the dehumanization of the enemy limits any possible
experience of the self since it requires a removal or quieting of
moral sense (47-48).
It is through suffering, then, that the exploited gain
themselves back, self-recognition. However, Chavez’s theory of
the self as connected to suffering relates to two ideas from the
history of philosophy: (1) the way in which angst and toil furthers
the progression of self-consciousness in Hegel’s master/slave
dialectic, and (2) the development of the self in conjunction
with an awareness of suffering in Freud’s later work. My concern
here is that Chavez’s pattern of thinking shares an understanding
of human consciousness (on a critically reflective level) often
espoused in relations of oppression, alienation, and sometimes
violence.
For Hegel, especially in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where
he tries to provide an account of how objective knowledge
of the world is possible, the move from sense-certainty to
self-consciousness requires the realization that one does not
live in a solipsistic world but a place inhabited by other (self-)
consciousnesses. Initially these others serve as objects through
which self-realization is possible.8 When this realization occurs
a social pattern tends to develop, it rests upon the necessity of
abolishing the alien aspects of others in order to discover the
self in them—an act that denies their alterity (Hegel, p. 167). This
is Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, a life-and-death struggle that
thrives on the tension generated by opposition. Here, the progress
of Spirit’s self-consciousness requires domination. However, as
it is well known, an inversion takes place and the slave ends up
being the one with the real sense of self, i.e., the real ability to
arrive at self-discovery (Hegel, p. 193). The means through which
this is done are the toils of labor; the ability to endure work and
suffer hardships as a slave brings the type of recognition furthering
self-consciousness. The slave finds himself/herself in the world
through labor—a type of suffering.
Likewise, in Civilization and Its Discontents, while providing
a pathology of the inclusive or “oceanic” feeling endorsed by
representatives of religious traditions, Freud argues that the
initial detachment or formulation of the ego arises out of our
first instances of pain and suffering.9 The realization of the split
or partition between one’s self and the world around them (our
alienation from the world around us) is caused by the desire to
appease the various means through which displeasure arises.
In this scenario our sense of self is not possible without the
frustration that arises from realization that the world does not
automatically respond to our needs. Our needs only become
apparent through suffering. Maturing and becoming a full
member of society implies the proper sublimation of desires
via the constrictions of social relations, e.g., the reality principle.
However, this process requires the type of self-examination that
necessitates suffering in the first place.
When Orosco writes, “Besides evoking the cultural
symbolism of the procession, Chavez intended the Sacramento
March to be a time for the farmworkers and other marchers to
model the penitent and suffer from fatigue, heat, and thirst in
order to induce self-reflection,” (27) does he not place Chavez
in line with the previous thinkers? To argue that people need to
feel pain in order to self-reflect or gain the type of awareness
that awakens one’s moral sensibilities is to think that moral
reasoning is impossible without suffering. In addition, if taken to
their extreme, do the possible outcomes of a hunger strike (i.e.,
starvation) amount to self-inflicted violence? If starvation is not
the goal, but the goal is to force a moral circumstance, what is
it that makes this situation moral? It is the fact that someone’s
well-being is at stake. Chavez’s actions personify this fact; the
actions of the growers are killing, harming, or hindering people,

and Chavez must go through his protest to make this visible.
But again, does this not require the threat of death, even if it is
self-inflicted? To say that peace requires sacrifice, and that this
sacrifice is violent or harmful towards oneself, is to really say
that peace requires violence, but not the type aimed towards
others.
Thus, Chavez’s long marches and fast are performative acts
requiring the (possible) presence of death to highlight a moral
situation. Using Chavez’s words, Orosco writes, “He believes
that when people see these symbols of sacrifice they will be
moved to help in some fashion. ‘When you sacrifice you force
others to sacrifice. It’s a powerful weapon. When somebody
stops eating for a week or ten days, people come and they want
to be part of that experience’” (105; emphasis added). In no way
do I seek to challenge the goals of La Causa. As a philosopher I
am only interested in what philosophical or theoretical insights
I can infer from Chavez’s actions. This is especially true in light
of his views on moral reasoning.
Deliberation, communication, and peace being crucial to
Chavez’s ideals, human social organization and the political
structures that come to support it are drastically different
in a framework where power is joint exercise of affective
communication (25). Individuals working together require the
ability to live peacefully. Living peacefully is not that difficult
when people work together to bring it about. Building on the
work of Hannah Arendt, Orosco argues that rather than having
“power over” (governance as domination), “power with” is the
recognition of the shared goals of a community (93).
In this sense rather than argue that we live in uncertain
yet critical times, i.e., moments of crises, Orosco holds Chavez
to be quite sure of the goals he seeks to realize. Not being an
advocate of crisis time, which uses the fear of social catastrophe
as a motivator for social change, Chavez was quite confident
that justice and truth would prevail (106). “Sooner or later,” he
thought, “truth is going to be exposed. …Mankind has never been
able to deal with the suppression of truth” (107). Though there
are possible eschatological and certain teleological aspects to
this train of thought, such that one can speculate whether or not
a concern with a final judgment or day of reckoning is present,
the message is quite clear: peace and social justice take time.
In other words, peace requires patience, the literal definition
of which is the quality of enduring suffering.
Endnotes
1. See Jose-Antonio Orosco 2008, 23-27.
2. Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan (Indiana: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1994), 74-78.
3. See Samuel Huntington’s Who Are We? The Challenges to
American National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2004), and Victor Davis Hanson’s Mexifornia: A State of
Becoming (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003), for
more on this growing fear of immigration and national
dissolution.
4. Orosco provides the following comment by a grower: “We
protect our farmers here in Kern County. They are our best
people. They are always with us. They keep the country
going. …But the Mexicans are trash. They have no standard
of living. We herd them like pigs” (Emphasis Added) (Orosco
2008, 80).
5. Aware of the complexities that surround this term, I use
‘trans-national’ in the sense that Chavez’s project exceeds or
ventures beyond the goal of reconstituting the nation. Hence
the prefix ‘trans.’ Perhaps a more appropriate term could be
‘meta-national’ (in the fashion of meta-ethics or metaphysics),
since it is safe to say that the cultural or social atmosphere of
a people supply the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the possibility (and need) of a country in the first place. But
I am sure that this is another paper altogether.
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6.
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“Chavez wants a man to be someone who is willing to
sacrifice himself and his well-being for the benefit of others,
not by fighting or using physical strength but by taking the pain
of others upon himself, feeling it, through nonviolent practice
and discipline” (Orosco 2008, 91). For more see Orosco 2008,
88-89.
For some, this masochism has its roots in Indigenous practices
of Mesoamerica (Orosco 2008, 28).
G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). (See section “B” of
“Self-Consciousness”; pp. 174-77 and the subsection titled
“Lordship and Bondage” in particular.)
Sigmund Freud. Civilization and Its Discontents (New York:
Norton & Company, 2005), 39-41.
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